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The standard public ¯nance analysis of the welfare cost of labour in-
come taxation is based on the estimation of labour supply functions that
treat unemployed individuals as non-participants. This paper applies
econometric models of multinomial discrete choice to the labour mar-
ket, explicitly allowing individuals to be in any of three possible states
(employment, unemployment and non-participation). Based on these es-
timates, we present calculations of the dead-weight loss of taxes, which
turn out to be much larger than those suggested by the standard litera-
ture.
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11 Introduction
The calculation of the welfare cost of labour market taxes has been a focus of
research in public economics for at least two decades. This level of interest is not
surprising. Modern governments raise such a high proportion of their revenue
from income and social security taxes that the welfare costs of these taxes are of
crucial interest to policy makers. What is surprising, however, is that most of the
empirical analysis has tended to avoid the issue of unemployment. The focus has
been on the estimation of hours equation over samples consistingof the employed
workers only. Some authors, especially when analyzing women's labour supply,
did allow for non-participation.1 In general, however, little attempt has been
made to account for the unemployed. This paper calculates the welfare cost of
labour market taxes in a frame-work that explicitly allows for unemployment
and non-participation.
Within the frame work of the traditional literature there are two possible
ways of dealing with those individuals observed to be unemployed. One can
either include them in the estimation sample and treat them as having supplied
zero hours or, alternatively, one can exclude them from the sample, using only
the employed to estimate labour supply elasticities. Ham (1982) showed that
both these approaches resulted in biased estimates of the labour supply function.
If the unemployed are included in the estimation sub-sample, and if they are
truly constrained, then the di®erence between observed and desired hours will
be incorporated into the residual. Thus the residual will be correlated with the
independent variables rendering least squares estimates of the labour supply
function biased and inconsistent. Alternatively, if the unemployed are dropped,
sample selection bias is introduced. Unless one is prepared to believe that
unemployment is a random event whose occurrence is uncorrelated with any
variables that may in°uence tastes for work, estimation over a sample consisting
of only the employed, will lead to biased results.
Ham (1982) dealt with this problem by excluding the unemployed from the
sample and correcting for the resulting selection bias using Heckman (1979) pro-
cedure. However, he did not o®er a consistent treatment of non-participants,
those who reported zero hours but who were not unemployed. Non-participants
may have tastes for work that are systematically di®erent from either those
of the employed or the unemployed. Thus treating them as being like the em-
ployed (with zero hours \supplied") or like the unemployed, would lead tobiased
estimates. Similarly, excluding them from the sample would lead to another se-
lection bias.
In this paper, I apply multinomial discrete choice econometric models to
labour market data from the UK. These models explicitly allow an individual
to occupy any of three labour market states (employment, unemployment, non-
participation). Issues of sample selection do not arise because these models can
be estimated over the entire sample.
Two classes of models are used. The ¯rst class assumes that the individual
1See Mroz (1987) for an example.
2can choose to be unemployed. In this sense these are models of voluntary
unemployment. Unemployment is still distinct from non-participation, however.
Suppose, for example, that an individual turns down an o®er of a job at a low
wage and opts instead to remain searching. His unemployment is voluntary, in
the sense that he could have accepted the low wage job or have dropped out of
the labour market. This setup leads to Multinomial Logit (MNL) and Nested
Multinomial Logit (NMNL) estimators.
The second class of models treats unemployment as being completely in-
voluntary. Individuals can choose whether or not to participate. Conditional
on participation, they get a job with some probability. When making the par-
ticipation decision individuals are aware that participation does not guarantee
employment. This setup leads to a what may be described as a \nested probit"
estimator.
These estimates con¯rm some reasonable hypotheses regarding the labour
market. Most particularly, it seems that employment, unemployment and non-
participation are all qualitatively di®erent states. Formal tests of the hypothesis
that the unemployed have the same preferences as either the employed or the
nonparticipants are overwhelmingly rejected. Thus the results con¯rm those of
Flinn & Heckman (1983). Any analysis of labour supply that fails to take this
into account could be misleading.
The Deadweight Loss (DWL) of taxes can be calculated from these estimates
using the methods of Small & Rosen (1981) and McFadden (1986). The resulting
values of the DWL,in both the voluntary and involuntary unemployment models
are considerably higher than those found in much of the literature.
A possible explanation for these results is that the estimates presented here
capture the e®ect of wages (and taxes) on participation. The estimates in the
traditional literature report the e®ects of wages on hours supplied, conditional
on participation. If there are ¯xed costs of entry to the labour market, then we
might expect the participation elasticity to be higher than the hours elasticity.
Although not the original purpose of this research, it is interesting to note
that these results may help shed some light on the controversy regarding the
alleged bias of the Non-Linear Budget Set (NLBS) model of Hausman (1985).
The results presented here are similar in magnitude to those calculated using
theNLBS method by Hausman (1985). This is despite the fact that this paper
I treat the budget constraint as being linear. Some authors2 have suggested
that the NLBS results are due to the estimation method imposing high com-
pensated elasticities on the data. It may be, however, that the di®erence in the
results is due to the di®erent treatment of the non-participants. The linearized
method is typically estimated over the employed, so it returns the (low) com-
pensated elasticity of hours conditional on participation. The NLBS method,
being a generalized version of the Tobit procedure, easily accommodates the
non-participants (but not the unemployed). Therefore it would return an av-
erage of the participation and hours elasticity. The di®erence in the results of
the two procedures could be entirely due to a high elasticity of participation.
2See MaCurdy (1992) for example.
3Clearly further research is required before a de¯nitive statement can be made
on this issue, but the results presented here are suggestive.
The models estimated in this paper represent an improvement over the tra-
ditional literature in so far as they allow for both non-participation and unem-
ployment. They are still lacking in one signi¯cant aspect, however. In common
with much of the literature, they are partial equilibrium. I do not model the
aggregate constraint that generates unemployment. I assume that there is some
ine±ciency operating behind the scenes that prevents the labour market from
clearing. I do not investigate how this ine±ciency interacts with the tax sys-
tem. This interaction could have important implications for social welfare. The
imposition of even a small tax on an already distorted economy could have ¯rst
order welfare e®ects increasing even more the welfare cost of taxation. Sup-
pose, for example, that unemployment is the result of ine±cient matching of
job seekers and vacancies. The imposition of a tax on labour income could
reduce an individual's search e®ort. Apart from the direct e®ect on the individ-
uals welfare, this would also reduce other individuals' and ¯rms' welfare via the
search externality: one persons reduced search e®ort reduces the e®ectiveness
of all other individuals' job search and ¯rms' e®orts to ¯ll vacancies. Thus, the
search externality magni¯es the welfare cost of taxation.
Alternatively, the two sources of ine±ciency may actually counteract each
other. Continuing the search example, suppose that workers face a cost of
participation in the labour market and/or a search cost. In this case, anything
that forces workers to leave the labour market, will save them the search cost.
Thus the cost of taxation would be less than estimated here.
As yet another alternative, one could view unemployment as a job queue in
a ranking model i.e. where ¯rms have multiple applications for their vacancies.
In this economy, anything that causes an individual to leave the queue, raises
the welfare of those remaining on it, without hurting the ¯rms who receive
multiple applications. In this case the search externality reduces the welfare
cost of taxation.
The point being made here is that it is possible to envisage a multiplicity
of interacting e®ects. The dead-weight loss calculations presented here do not
account for any of these e®ects (if they exist). It is not possible to sign the bias
that results from this omission, as the examples given above indicate, it could
go either way. The standard models of competitive general equilibrium used
in public ¯nance to examine the issue of tax incidence are obviously unable to
resolve this issue. Its resolution requires further research into the incidence of
tax in non-competitive models. Correcting this omission is an obvious topic for
future research.
The paper is arranged as follows. Section 2 discusses the previous approaches
to calculating the welfare cost of labour income taxation. Section 3 presents the
econometric models used in this paper. Section 4 discusses the data. Section 5
presents estimates of the two classes of models and calculates the deadweight
loss of taxes. Section 6 concludes.
42 Previous Approaches to labour Supply
This section brie°y reviews the previous approaches to the estimation of models
of labour supply. Consider estimating a typical labour supply function such
as (1) over a sample consisting of the employed workers only, using Two Stage
Least Squares (2SLS).3 The estimates can be used to calculate the deadweight
loss (DWL) of taxes using the Harberger triangle formula.4
Hit = ® + ¯Wit + °Yit + ±Xit + "it (1)
The results (shown in table 1) are consistent with theory in so far as the esti-
mated Hicksian wage elasticity is positive. The size of the elasticity is within
the range reported by other authors for the UK, although it is at the higher
end of the range.5 Furthermore, the estimated DWL of taxes as a percentage
of the revenue raised, is within the range reported by many other researchers.
But it much smaller than those reported by Hausman (1985) using the method
of Non-Linear Budget Sets (NLBS).
Ham (1982) noted, however, that least squares applied to (2) will almost
certainly be biased, if we admit the possibility that there is unemployment. In
order to illustrate the point, suppose that equation (2) is the true labour supply
function i.e. H¤
it is the hours of work desired by the individual, where X is a
vector of independent variables and " is a normally distributed error.
H
¤
it = Xit¯ + "it (2)
Suppose that we try to estimate (2) using a sample consisting of both the
employed and the unemployed. In e®ect, we would be estimating equation (3)
where u(Zit) is the probability that an individual i is unemployed at time t
and Hit is the actual observed hours worked, with Hit = 0 for the unemployed.
Equation (2) incorporates into the residual any di®erence between observed and
desired hours caused by unemployment.
Hit = Xit¯ + ´it (3)
´it =
½
"it w:p 1 ¡ u(Zit)
"it ¡ H¤
it + Hit w:p u(Zit)
¾
If the unemployed are not truly constrained, so that E(H¤
it ¡ Hit) = 0, then
there is no problem (other than heteroscedasticity). They could be treated as
censored observations and equation (2) estimated using the Tobit procedure. If
they are constrained, however, it is clear that E(´jX) = ¡H¤u(Z) = ¡X¯u(Z),
then the residual is correlated with the independent variables and least squares
on (3) will be biased. The are two sources of bias. Firstly, even if unemployment
3The instruments used were education and household compositin variables together with




2t"h where "h is the Hicksian elasticity of labor supply and t is the ad-valorum
tax rate.
5See Blundell (1993) and Pencaval (1986).
5is random i.e. u(Z) is a constant, any change in X will change the size of the
constraint faced by the unemployed. This biases the least squares estimate of
¯ towards zero. Secondly, if some element of Z is also in X , then the extent
to which the constraint is binding in also changes. Least squares estimation of
equation (3) incorporates both these e®ects into the estimate of ¯.
An example will help clarify the issue. Consider a variable measuring an
individual's educational achievement. It is plausible that this variable a®ects
an individuals taste for work. It is equally plausible that education also a®ects
an individual's chances of becoming employed. In this case, if we estimate (2)
over all individuals, employed and unemployed, the residual will be correlated
with one of independent variables generating inconsistent estimates of education
on individuals' desired hours.
Ham (1982) notes that the alternative procedure, excluding the unemployed
from the estimation sample, is also likely to be biased. This is a standard sample
selection problem. Least squares estimation of (2), over the sub-sample of the
employed, will be consistent only if E("jemployed) 6= f(X). If unemployment
is a random event, so that the unemployed are not systematically di®erent from
the employed, then this condition is satis¯ed. We expect, however, that the
probability of being unemployed is a function of the same sort of variables
that enter a labour supply equation (education, for example). Intuitively, if the
unemployed tend to be those with less education, their exclusion from the sample
will bias estimates of the in°uence of education on tastes for work. Ham (1982)
corrected for this bias using the selection model of Heckman (1979) to estimate
a labour supply equation over the sample consisting of employed individuals
only.
The Heckman procedure can deal successfully with the problem of unem-
ployment, but does not account for the possible distinction between the unem-
ployed and non-participants. In fact we face a similar set of issues regarding
non-participants as we did regarding the unemployed. As in the case of the
unemployed, we can either include or exclude non-participants from the sample
used to estimate the model. In either case the estimates are likely to be biased.
If we believed that non-participants were randomly selected, then we could
safely exclude them from the estimation sample. If we believed that they were
not signi¯cantly di®erent from the employed, then we could treat them as cen-
sored observations and estimate a Tobit type model. If we believed that they
were not signi¯cantly di®erent from the unemployed we could simply re-estimate
the Ham (1982) model treating them as such. If we believe, however, that
the non-participants are, potentially, systematically di®erent from both the em-
ployed and the unemployed, then we ought to account for them separately. This
is most clearly done by estimating multinomial models of discrete choice. In this
paper, I apply multinomial discrete choice econometric models to labour market
data from the UK. These models explicitly allow an individual to occupy any of
the three labour market states (employment, unemployment, non-participation).
Issues of sample selection do not arise because these models can be estimated
over the entire sample.
63 An Econometric Model of Unemployment
It is clear from section 2 that we need an econometric procedure that is °exible
enough to allow for the three labour market states. Of crucial importance to this
how unemployment is modeled. I adopt two polar assumptions. In the following
sub-section I propose estimators based on the assumption that unemployment
is voluntary (in a sense to be made precise shortly). In the subsequent section
I propose an estimator based on the opposite assumption i.e. unemployment is
completely involuntary. In either case the Random Utility Model (RUM)6 is a
convenient framework within which to consider the alternative procedures.
A RUM model of labour market choice is given by equation (4). An individ-
ual, i, assigns (indirect) utility (U
j
it) to each of the three labour market states
in each time period. Utility consists of a deterministic component (V
j
it) and
an stochastic component (²
j
it) where j;k 2 fe;u;ng indicate employment status
(employed, unemployed and non-participant). The deterministic component is
a \linear in parameters" function of X
j
it, a matrix of independent variables at
time t, and ®j a vector of individual speci¯c e®ects. The stochastic compo-
nents have a joint distribution F (²e
it;²u
it;²n
it) with a covariance matrix §. For
convenience, I will assume that the covariance matrix is the same for all indi-
viduals (homoscedastic) and for all time periods. The stochastic component of
utility can be interpreted as either true randomness in preferences across time
and individuals, or as being that component of utility that is not observed by


















Equation (4) implies that each of the three labour market states may induce
di®erent levels of utility. In particular, being unemployed is not necessarily the
same as being a non-participant. In this manner the model already departs
from much of the traditional analysis.
3.1 Voluntary Unemployment
In the standard RUM the individual chooses whichever state provides the highest
utility. So, for example, the probability that an individual chooses employment
at time t, conditional on individual e®ects (®i), is given by equation (5). The




it where j = (u;n) g
= Prf²
j




it where j = (u;n) g
(5)
6See McFadden (1986) for a detailed discussion of the RUM.
7We cannot identify all the parameters of the model, because we observe only the demand
functionsand not the utility functionsdirectly. If avariable isconstantacross di®erentchoices
for the same individual then a normalization is necessary. In what follows I normalize Un
to be zero. Also I assume for simplicity that ®e = ®u. Attempts to estimate ®e and ®u
separately failed.
7Equation (5) is anything but innocuous. It implies that individuals may
choose to be unemployed. In fact they will do so if U u
it > Ue
it and Uu
it > U n
it .
In this sense unemployment is voluntary. This does not mean, however, that
unemployment is the same as non-participation. The two states could di®er in
terms of entitlement to public assistance or in the degree of e®ort exerted in
searching for employment. Unemployment is voluntary however, in the sense
that an unemployed individual could have accepted the low wage job or have
dropped out of the labour force. An econometric procedure based on (5) is
strictly correct only to the extent that we can believe that unemployment is
truly voluntary. This may strike some as being unreasonable, which is why,
in the next sub-section, unemployment is assumed to result entirely from the
imposition of a constraint.
With that caveat in mind we can estimate a model based on (5) by specifying
a functional form of F. If we denote the partial derivative of F with respect to





















The integrand in (6) is the probability that ²e equals a particular value and that
the other disturbances are such that E will be chosen. By integrating over the
support of ²e we get the probability that E is chosen (conditional on ®i). The
probabilities of the other employment states are derived symmetrically.
In order to control for the individual (random) e®ects, we integrate them
out of equation (6). We then calculate equation (7), the log likelihood of the
sample of N individuals over T periods, where d
j
it is a dummy variable equal
to one if individual i is observed in state j at time t, and Á is the p.d.f. of the
random e®ects. In general the ¯rst, and second, order conditions of (7) do not
have convenient analytical forms. Maximization of the likelihood will have to
be done numerically.





















Before proceeding, it is worth making clear why ¯xed e®ects estimators are
not used. In general, these are not available for non-linear models. Because
of the non-linearities, the ¯xed e®ect cannot be di®erenced out as with the
least squares \within-groups" estimator. Therefore, it must be estimated as an
incidental parameter. This yields consistent estimates only if there are su±cient
observations through time foreach individual. This is not true in most datasets.
Furthermore, because the MLE of the coe±cients on the independent variables
and the incidental parameter are jointly determined, any inconsistency will be
passed on to the estimates of the other coe±cients.
Small & Rosen (1981) and McFadden (1986) provide method of calculating
the dead-weight loss in the for discrete choice models. They show that in the
8case of a RUM such as (4) that the probability function (6) can be treated as
being the demand function and that many of the standard results of consumer
theory for continuous goods hold also for discrete choice. In particular, the
Compensating Variation (CV) of any price change can be calculated by inte-
grating the area under the compensated demand curve, to get equation (8),








P e(V e)dV e (8)
The Dead Weight Loss (DWL) of a tax is given by the CV less the tax revenue
measured at the compensated point. Note that the scale of Compensating Vari-
ation is important. It is straight forward to show that its scale will be the same
as that of the other income variable, which here is pounds sterling per month.
Thus the CV calculation will tell us the amount an individual would have to
be paid on a monthly basis in order that he be no worse o® as a result of the
imposition of the tax.
3.1.1 Multinomial Logit (MNL)
Following McFadden (1974), assume that the ² in (4) are i.i.d. extreme value9,







it) + exp(V u
it) + exp(V n
it)
(9)
By maximizing the log-likelihood in (7) with P(Jitj®i) given by (9) we can
estimate the MNL model controlling for individual e®ects.
It is worth noting at this point that Chamberlin (1980) proposed a ¯xed
e®ects estimator for the MNL model. Unfortunately this procedure e®ectively
drops from the sample all those whose status has not changed over the period
of the sample. This would tend to bias the estimates if, for example, those who
were employed for the entire duration are systematically di®erent from those
who were not. Therefore, when I estimate a MNL model I adopt the alternative
to the Chamberlin method, treating the individual e®ects as being random,
drawn from a normal distribution, and integrate them out, as in equation (7).
This allows the MNL to be estimated over the entire sample without the loss of
any class of observations
The expression in (8) for the compensating variation of a price change has
a convenient closed form in the case of the MNL model, reducing to equation
8In ordertoderive (8)we must assume thatthe marginal utility of income isindependent of
wages. This is true in the models estimated here because utility is linear in the income term.
In this case the Marshallian concept of consumer surplus coincides with the compensating
variation.
9F(²e;²u;²n) = exp(¡[exp(¡²e)+exp(¡²u)+ exp(¡²n)])
























3.1.2 Nested Multinomial Logit (NMNL)
The assumption inherent in the MNL model, that the errors are i.i.d. is not
reasonable in many situations. It imposes restrictions on the cross price elas-
ticities that are often unrealistic.11 The model e®ectively assumes that all the
alternatives are equally similar, once we have controlled for observables. In the
context of the labour market, we might expect, for example, that employment
and unemployment are similar, because both imply attachment to the labour
force. Therefore, their random components will be correlated. Alternatively, we
may think, that it is unemployment and non-participation that are similar as
both are types of \non-work". Therefore it is the random components of utility
of non-participation and utility of unemployment that should be correlated.
The NMNL model, due to McFadden (1986) was designed precisely to deal
with this problem.12 The probability of observing an employed individual is




it) + exp(V u
it)g¹¡1
fexp(V e
it) + exp(V u
it)g¹ + exp(V n
it)
(11)
The parameter ¹ represents the degree of dissimilarity between the unob-
served components of the utility of employment and unemployment.14 When
¹ is one, all the unobservables are equally similar, equation (11) reduces to
equation (9) and the NMNL reduces to the MNL model.
The model is estimated by substituting (11) into the likelihood function (7).
The model is more easily understood, however, if it is expressed in terms of tree
structure of sequential conditional probabilities. We can think of estimating
10Hausman et. al. (1997)used (10) to calculate a portion ofthe welfare costofExon Valdez
oil spill.
11In the literature this restriction is often refered to as \Independence of Irrelevant Alter-
natives" (IIA).
12The Multinomial Probit Model would also allow us to avoid the IIA problem. Keane
(1992) showed, however, that while the covariance parameters are formally identi¯ed, they
can easily be mimicked by the coe±cients on the independent variables. Thus, in practice
estimation may fail, unless we can impose restrictions which may help separate movement in
the independent variables from movements in the covariance parameters. I failed to estimate
the model successfully with any economically sensible restrictions other than IIA! As one
would expect, these results were similar to those of the MNL model and are not reported
here.
13For the NMNL model the joint distribution of the errors is given by F(²e;²u;²n) =
exp(¡[exp(¡²e)+ exp(¡²u)]¹ +[exp(¡²n)]¹)
14Ben-Akiva and Lerman (1985) show that ¹ =
p
1¡ corr("e;"u)
10the model in two stages.15 Suppose that labour market decisions are struc-
tured as follows. Individuals choose between participating in, or dropping out
of, the labour force. This is the standard labour supply, or participation, de-



















Each decision can be modelled as a standard binomial logit. The ¯rst stage
\participation" logit (12) has an extra regressor ¸it, known as the \inclusive
value". This regressor can be thought of as a composite utility index which
summarizes the outcome of the second stage \employment" logit (13) i.e. it
represents the utility of participation. The coe±cient on the inclusive value (¹)
is a measure of the similarity of U and E because it applies equally to both V e
it
and V u
it in the regression.
McFadden (1986) notes that a su±cient condition for the estimated model
to be consistent with utility maximization is that ¹ 2 [0;1].16 If the estimated
model was found to be inconsistent with utility maximization then welfare calcu-
lations based on these estimates would be meaningless. According to McFadden
(1986), if the estimate of ¹ is outside the permissible range the fault may lie
with the speci¯cation of the decision tree i.e. in our example it may be un-
employment and non-participation that are similar and not employment and
unemployment. We estimate the model using both structures.
Once we have estimated the NMNL model satisfactorily, we can perform
welfare calculations as in the MNL model. For the case of the NMNL the
expression for the Compensating Variation of a price change given by (8) has a















The estimators of the previous section were based on the idea that unemploy-
ment was voluntarily chosen but still di®erent from non-participation. In this
15The sequential estimator can be used to produce consisten, but ine±cient, estimates of
the model (see McFadden, 1984).
16To see this, one can di®erentiate (11) with respect to V u. For the model to be consistent
with utility maximization, this derivative must be negative i.e. the probability that the
individual chooses employment must fall when the utility of an alternative increases. The
derivative will be negative for all values of V j if ¹ < 1. It may be negative for certain values
of V j even if ¹ > 1. Therefore ¹ < 1 is a su±cient, but not necessary, condition for utilty
maximization.
11section we take the opposite position and assume that unemployment is com-
pletely involuntary. Unemployment is the result of a constraint. The individual
can do nothing to alter the probability of being employed once he decides to
participate. They only choice that exists is between participation and non-
participation. Suppose, that the labour market decisions are structured as fol-
lows: Individuals choose between participating in, or dropping out of, the labour
force. This is the standard supply decision. Then, conditional on participation,
individuals either get a job or become unemployed. The second stage is the result
of the imposition of an outside constraint. This is the sense in which unemploy-
ment is involuntary. Individuals make their participation decision knowing that
participation does not guarantee employment. The probability that an individ-
ual gets a job if he participates is modeled as a function of exogenous variables
that are outside the control of the individual.17 For example, a youth with a
low level of education, living in a high unemployment area has a low probability
of being employed. Knowing this, he may be less willing to seek work at any
given wage level.
Formally this structure can be modeled as follows: Individuals choose be-
tween participation, which yields indirect utility Ul
it, and non-participation
which yields U n
it: The utility of non-participation is as de¯ned previously. The
utility of participation is modeled as a function of the payo® if the individual
secures employment, the payo® if he becomes unemployed and the probability
that participation will yield employment. A convenient and logical speci¯cation
is to model the utility of participation as the expected utility of the gamble
that participation will yield employment with probability pit. This is shown in
equation (15) where the random variables, U e
it , Uu
it and Un
it are de¯ned in (4)
and ´it ´ pit ¤ ²e




it = pit ¤U e
it + (1 ¡ pit) ¤ Uu
it
= pit(V e
it ¡ V u
it) + V u
it + ´it
(15)
The individual will choose participation if Ul
it > U n
it. Conditional on participa-
tion he will get a job with probability pit. Therefore the probability of observing
the individual in each of the three states is given by (16). Substituting (16) into
(7) will enable FIML estimation of the model controlling for random e®ects.
P (Litj®i) = P(U l
it > U n
it )
P (Eitj®i) = pit ¤ P(Litj®i)
P (Uitj®i) = (1 ¡ pit) ¤ P(Litj®i)
P (Nitj®i) = 1¡ P(Litj®i)
(16)
The econometric model can be more clearly understood as a two stage model
whose structure mirrors that of the labour market. First we estimate the prob-
ability of employment conditional on participation, pit as a function of all the
exogenous variables. This is a standard binomial discrete dependent variable
17Thus the analysisdoesnot allow for any attemptby participantsto improve theirchances
of ¯nding employment by, for example, migrating to a di®erent region or improving their
educational quali¯cations.
12model such as probit or logit. As no choice is involved, this part of the model
has no RUM interpretation and no direct welfare implication. Then the ¯t-
ted values from this regression can be used for pit in estimating the binomial
choice between participation and non-participation. This second stage has the
standard RUM interpretation as discussed in the previous sub-section.
We can implement the expected utility model of equation (15) by specifying
the errors to be i.i.d. standard normal random variables. The probability of
participation is then given by P(Lit) = P(Ul
it > U n
it ).18








As ´ is a sum of normal random variables of mean zero, it also is a normal
random variable of mean zero. A potential problem arises with its variance, as
this is a function of pit which varies across individuals. Thus even if the ² are
homoscedastic, the errors in the estimated model will be heteroscedastic. Het-
eroscedasticity in non-linear models leads to inconsistency as well as ine±ciency
(see Greene, 1993). Fortunately, the nature of the heteroscedasticity is clear in
this case, thus we can model it directly. Assuming that " are homoscedastic
with identity covariance matrix, the variance of ´ is given by
V ar(´it) = 1 + 2 ¤ p2
it ¡ 2¤ pit
Once we have estimated the model, we can then use the method of Small
and Rosen (1981) to calculate the compensating variation of any taxation. The
expression for the compensating variation of a price change in (8) must be
modi¯ed to account for the fact that the individual now faces only a binomial
choice between participation and non-participation. In this case the expression

























4 Data & Speci¯cation
The analysis is conducted using a British dataset, the British Household Panel
Survey (BHPS),which covers four years from 1991-95.19 This dataset has three
particular advantages. Firstly, it contains information on the labour market
status of respondents, enabling the di®erence between unemployment and non-
participation to be clearly de¯ned. Secondly, because the data is a panel, we
will be able to control for individual speci¯c (unobserved) e®ects. Thirdly,
unemployment in Britain has been higher and more persistent than in the United
States (though less so than in the rest of Europe). Therefore it is reasonable
18As before we normalize Un = 0 and assume for simplicity that ®e = ®u.
19Table (8)reportsthe deinitionsand, forthe non-categorical variables, the summarystatis-
tics of the major variables used in the analysis. The variable rate m is from the labor force
survey.
13to suspect that the treatment of unemployment may have more of an a®ect on
measures of the dead weight loss of taxes in Britain rather than in the U.S.
I exclude women from the sample following the tradition in the labour supply
literature which views the labour supply decision processes of the two sexes as
being qualitatively di®erent. I also exclude from the analysis all those men who
were employed but for whom no wage was reported and those over 70 years
of age.20 After dropping observations with missing values, we are left with a
balanced panel of 1;866 men observed at each of the four annual waves.
The precise de¯nitions of employment status are obviously crucial for the
question at hand. Unfortunately, the exact de¯nition of involuntary unem-
ployment is problematic, as Ashenfelter (1978) pointed out. An economically
sensible de¯nition, proposed by Ashenfelter (1978), would hold that an indi-
vidual, A, is involuntarily unemployed if, and only if, two conditions are met.
Firstly, there must exist another individual, B, identical to A in preferences and
skills, who is employed. Secondly, A must be willing to take B's job under the
same terms as B if it were to be o®ered. Obviously in practice it is impossible
to implement this de¯nition because it is impossible to match people so closely.
Most statistically implemented de¯nitions of unemployment rely on individ-
uals reporting their own employment status and then apply some consistency
check to ensure that the constraint they claim to face is reasonable and that
the unemployed individual is close to satisfying Ashenfelter's de¯nition. The
standard OECD de¯nition requires that the unemployed individual has actively
searched for work during the previous four weeks. If he has not done so, then
he is judged to be a non-participant. In practice there is quite a lot of variation
across countries in the precise de¯nition of the \standardized" unemployment
rate.21
The OECD de¯nition seems too restrictive. Search e®ort is likely to be de-
termined by the perceived probability of success as much as it is by the tastes
of workers. The OECD de¯nition would tend to systematically exclude dis-
couraged workers. These individuals may be as willing to accept the o®er of
a job as are the other unemployed, but they are disillusioned with the e±cacy
of job search and therefore no longer actively search. The problem is that we
are trying to approximate a continuous variable (degree of attachment to the
labour force or search e®ort) by a discrete division. There will always be a
degree of ambiguity in the choice of where exactly we should draw the dividing
line between unemployment and non-participation.
Jones and Riddell (1999) examined this issue in detail using Canadian data.
They found that there is an important degree of heterogeneity among the group
conventionally classi¯ed as non-participants: those who indicate that they desire
to work exhibit distinctly di®erent behaviour from the remainder of the group.
I de¯ne as unemployed any individual who does not have a job but reported
that he would work if he were o®ered a job. The precise de¯nition of employment
status is as follows:
20Even at age 70, some 16% percent of respondants described themselves as being in the
labour force.
21See OECD (1986)
14² A person is de¯ned as employed (E) if he was working the week before the
interview. For these individuals I observe hours worked strictly greater
than zero and the usual net and gross wage.
² A person is de¯ned as unemployed (U), if he did not have a job the week
before the interview but reported that he would take one if o®ered. Both
the employed and the unemployed constitute the labour force.
² A person is considered to be \not in the labour force" (N) if he does not
belong to either of the other two categories.
The sample unemployment rate is about 14% over the four years.22 This
makes it signi¯cantly higher than the o±cial unemployment rate for the U.K.
over the same period, which was 10% or so. This re°ects the di®erence in
the de¯nition of unemployment. Some individuals, who are classi¯ed as non-
participants under the o±cial scheme, are classi¯ed as unemployed here. This
probably results from a re-classi¯cation of discouraged workers as being unem-
ployed rather than as non-participants.
In order to estimate the models of section three we need estimates of the
market wage faced by the unemployed and the non-participants. Following the
literature, I ¯rst regress the wage on the set of exogenous variables and use the
¯tted values as regressors in the models of section three.
The exogenous variables used here are similar to those used throughout the
literature. They fall into three broad categories: human capital; household
composition; and time and region ¯xed e®ects. The human capital variables are
all related to education and occupation (educ, pasoc, tae). The household
composition variables include marital status (marstat), the number of depen-
dent children of various ages (k02y-k1618y) and a dummy for being head of
household (hoh).
The wage equation was estimated by regressing (log) nwage on dummies
created from the above exogenous variables.23 We employ the Heckman (1979)
procedure to deal with the sample selection problem. We ¯rst estimate a probit
selection equation using all the exogenous variables together with interactions
between time and region dummies. This probit is used to calculate the inverse
mills ratio which appears as an additional variable in the wage equation. The
results are shown in Table 6.
This procedure is not without controversy. Only the exogeneity of fathers
occupation (pasoc), age and the time dummies are absolutely assured. One
could argue that the human capital variables, the household composition vari-
ables and even the regional dummies are all the result of choices that are made
jointly with the choice of labour market status and are therefore not exogenous.
The are two defences against this criticism. Firstly, it can be argued that,
while these variables are formally the result of choices, those choices are su±-
22Unemployment rate is de¯ned as
U
U +E
23An analagous gross wage equation was also estimated. It had the same speci¯cation as
the net wage equation but with the log of gwage as the dependent variable.
15ciently independent of the choice of employment status to enable the resulting
variables to be treated as being exogenous in practice. For example, education
may be thought to be endogenous because we choose a higher level of education
in anticipation that this will enable us to earn higher wages, avoid unemploy-
ment etc. But it is also plausible to suggest that the choice of education is as
much a result of available opportunities, parental encouragement, personal abil-
ities etc. To the extent that this is so, the level of education can be considered
to be exogenous. Similar arguments can be made in relation to the household
composition variables.
The second defence is that the contribution of this paper to the literature,
is not intended to be the improvement on the identi¯cation of previous mod-
els. Instead the focus of the paper is on the implications of unemployment for
estimation of labour supply. It seems reasonable, therefore, to adopt standard
practice in all other respects.
We also need to estimate the level of public assistance (bene¯ts) that would
accrue were the current employed to change status. The U.K. bene¯ts system is
quite complicated.24 The unemployed and some non-participants can both be
eligible for public assistance. Furthermore some low paid workers may also be
eligible for the receipt of means tested bene¯ts. The system is too complicated
to model directly.25 Therefore we regress the log of bene¯ts on the exogenous
variables correcting for selection using the heckit procedure. The idea is that
the regressors, especially the household composition variables, will approximate
su±ciently closely the eligibility rules for public assistance.
Finally, the issue of how to model the budget constraint must be decided.
There is considerable controversy in the literature over whether it is appropriate
to model the budget constraint directly as in Hausman (1985). Some authors
suggest that the Non-Linear Budget Set (NLBS) procedure biases the results
towards ¯nding large deadweight losses. Other authors maintain that it is the
linearized method that it biased.26 This decision is important because the re-
sults di®er substantially depending on which method is chosen, with the NLBS
procedure usually generating much higher estimates of the cost of taxation.27
For this paper it was decided not to use the NLBS methodology in order that
nothing may detract from the focus of the paper on the implications of un-
employment for measures of the welfare cost of taxation. We try to follow the
traditional model in all its aspects, other than in its traetment of unemployment
and non-participation. Any di®erence between the results presented here and
the traditional literature can be attributed to the treatment of unemployment
and not to the use of the NLBS method.
24For a survey see Atkinson and Micklewright (1991).
25Also modeling the bene¯t system directly would entail using the NLBS procedure. This
is something we would rather not do for the reasons discussed in section 2.
26See Bloomquist (1995) for arguments in favour of the NLBS methodology and MaCurdy
(1992) for arguments against.
27See Hausman (1985) for a comparisson.
165 Results
Table 2 shows the results of the estimation of both the MNL and NMNL mod-
els of voluntary unemployment. The ¯rst two columns show, for the MNL
model, the coe±cients of V e and V u, the indirect utility of employment and
unemployment respectively. The coe±cients of V n, the indirect utility of non-
participation, are normalized to zero. The model was estimated subject to the
constraint that wages have no direct impact on unemployment and bene¯ts have
no direct impact on employment. In the context of the RUM, this restriction
implies that the conditional utility of each state is dependent only on the \price"
associated with that state. A Likelihood Ratio test of this restriction produces
a Â2 statistic of 0:68 which implies that we can not reject the restriction at any
standard signi¯cance level.
The estimated coe±cients take on plausible values. A higher wage tends
to increase the relative probability that an individual is employed.28 Similarly,
higher bene¯ts increase the probability that the individual will choose unem-
ployment over employment or non-participation. The coe±cient on the other
income term indicates that higher non-labour income will tend to discourage
participation in the labour market, either as a worker or as a job seeker. In gen-
eral the coe±cients on the polynomial in age were individually insigni¯cant but
collectively signi¯cant.29 The presence of dependent children has no signi¯cant
e®ect on the labour market participation of men. The coe±cient on the dummy
variable indicating that the individual is married, is positive as expected. Mar-
ried men have greater attachment to the labour force than un-married men,
and are more likely to be employed or to be seeking work and less likely to be
non-participants.
These results suggest that unemployment and employment are very di®erent
states. Similarly we may wish to test is that the unemployed are the same as
non-participants i.e. ¯
u = ¯
n = 0. If this hypothesis were true then we could
explain the labour market behavior by estimating a traditional binomial logit
model of participation. Again a likelihood ratio test of this hypothesis lead to
its rejection con¯rming the result of Flinn and Heckman (1983).30
The estimates in Table 2 can be used to calculate the welfare cost of taxation
as explained in section three. Table 3 shows this calculation and some of its in-
termediate steps, for the sample as a whole, and for quartiles of the distribution
of the gross wage. The calculations use the estimates of the MNL model from
Table 2. In order to understand how Table 3 is constructed, consider an average
individual who earns $1;054 per month and faces an average tax rate of 24%.31
28Some care should be taken when interpreting the coe±cients in any multinomial model.
They do not necessarily have the same sign as the marginal probabilities. In the case of




29A Wald test of the hypothesis that all age variables should be dropped produced a Â2
statistic of 14:23 which leads to rejection of the hypothesis at 5% signi¯cance level.
30The Likelihood Ratio test statistic is ....
31The OECD (1993) reports that this was the approximately the average tax rate paid
by industrial workers in the United Kingdom over the period during which the dataset was
17Given the estimated parameters in Table 2 we can evaluate equation (9) for each
individual. These ¯tted values are the employment and unemployment rates af-
ter the tax has been imposed, as reported in the table 3. If we assume that the
tax system is approximately proportional we can calculate the employment and
unemployment rates before tax by simulating (9) using the gross wage in place
of the net wage. Then using (10), we can calculate the monthly Compensating
Variation per worker to be $244 on average. This amount is su±cient to restore
workers on average to their pre-tax utility given that they are now less likely to
choose employment because of the imposition of the tax. The revenue raised by
this tax is $272 per worker per month on average. This ¯gure must be adjusted
for the fact that the imposition of the tax reduces the number of individuals
working both directly as a result of the tax, but also indirectly as a result of the
payment of the compensating variation.32 This gives tax revenue of $208 per
month on average from each individual (as distinct from each worker).33 Thus
the DWL of the tax is $35:89 per month or 26% of revenue.
The most striking feature of Table 3 is the size of the DWL. As reported in
section 2, typical measures of the welfare cost of labour market taxes have been
of the order of 2 to 3%. The estimates produced here are an order of magnitude
greater. Furthermore, the pattern of the DWL across the income distribution
is curious. The cost appears to be highest for those in the middle of the income
distribution and lower for those at either end.
It is interesting to note that the DWL ¯gures shown in Table 3 are very close
to those reported by Hausman (1985) using the NLBS method. This fact helps
shed some light on controversy over whether the NLBS method is biased. The
existing literature on the estimation of labour supply models suggests that the
treatment of the budget constraint matters. Pencaval (1986) reports that esti-
mates of the compensated elasticity of supply given by the linearization method
are smaller, by a factor of ¯ve, than the estimates using the NLBS procedure of
Hausman (1985). McCurdy (1992) has argued that this di®erence is due to the
fact that the Hausman method e®ectively imposes large compensated elastici-
ties on the data. The results presented here suggest that the crucial issue may
be the treatment of non-participants. The linearized method is typically esti-
mated over the employed, so it returns the low compensated elasticity of hours
conditional on participation. The NLBS method, being a generalized version
of the Tobit procedure, easily accommodates the non-participants (but not the
unemployed) generating an average of the participation and hours elasticities.
Therefore the di®erence in measured elasticities could be entirely due to a high
elasticity of participation.
The second two columns of Table 2 show estimates of the NMNL model.
As can be seen, the coe±cients are very similar to those estimated in the MNL
model. With the exception of the coe±cient on married in V u, allthe coe±cients
collected.
32We follow Diamond and McFadden (1974) in calculating the tax revenue at the compen-
sated point.
33Note that the revenue ¯gure in the table is E(Wage ¤ tax ¤ prob: emp) 6= E(wage) ¤
E(tax)¤E(prob: emp:)
18in the NMNL model have the same sign as those in the MNL. Thus the basic
results of the MNL model are con¯rmed by the NMNL model. A higher wage
tends to increase the relative probability of being employed and reduce the
relative probability of being unemployed. The coe±cient on bene¯t income has
a positive e®ect on the relative probability of being unemployed. As in the
case of the MNL, the data cannot reject the hypothesis that wages have zero
e®ect in the unemployment equation and bene¯ts have a zero coe±cient in the
employment equation. Similarly, the model also rejects the hypothesis that the





The coe±cient on the inclusive value term, ¹, deserves special attention.
McFadden (1986) notes that if the coe±cient on the inclusive value is signi¯-
cantly di®erent from unity, then the data rejects the hypothesis of independent
errors necessary to estimate the model as a standard multinomial logit. As can
be seen from Table 2, the data decisively rejects this hypothesis. We also know
from section three that if ¹ > 1 the model is not consistent with utility max-
imization. McFadden (1986) suggested that it may be that the tree structure
implicit in the model is incorrect. Therefore we estimated an alternative tree
structure was also estimated whereby U and N were hypothesized to be similar.
This model produced nonsensical results (not reported here). In particular ¹
turned out to be negative.
If the data and model are not consistent with utility maximization welfare
calculations have little meaning. Nevertheless, Hausman et. al. (1997) report
that empirical implementations of the NMNL model often produce estimates
of ¹ greater than unity. A justi¯cation for this is that the condition, ¹ < 1
is su±cient for consistency with utility maximization, but it is not necessary.
Therefore it is still worthwhile to report in table 4 the results for the DWL of
tax using the NMNL estimates. This table was calculated in the same manner
as table 3 using equations (11) and (14). Note that the DWL is slightly higher
for the case of the NMNL model. The NMNL allows for a greater degree of
similarity between alternatives than does the MNL. Therefore we might expect
the welfare cost to be lower as there is less lost when individual moves from one
alternative to another similar alternative. The fact that we do not observe this,
is a further indication that the NMNL model may be misspeci¯ed.
If the NMNL model is misspeci¯ed then doubt is also cast on the validity
of the MNL model. The MNL model is nested within the NMNL model, so if
the latter is rejected so is the former. One obvious reason why these models
could be misspeci¯ed is that unemployment is not, in fact, voluntary as was as-
sumed. This leads to the estimation of the model of involuntary unemployment
as discussed in section three.
Table 5 shows results for the joint (FIML) estimation of (17). The variables
in employment probability equation are jointly and individually signi¯cant. This
implies that occurrence of unemployment is not a random event but is corre-
lated with variables that typically enter labour supply equations either directly
or indirectly via the wage. This may not be surprising, but it is a factor that
the traditional labour supply models tend to ignore. The individual estimated
coe±cients in this equation take on plausible values. The probability that the
19individual gets a job, conditional on his decision to participate, increases with
increasing education. It falls with higher regional unemployment and is higher
for married men than for single men. In addition it is higher for white men than
for non-whites and ¯rst rises, then falls with increasing age.34 The coe±cients
of the indirect utility indices V e and V u are also mostly as expected. A higher
wage increases the utility of employment and hence the probability of partic-
ipation. Higher unearned income decreases utility of both employment and
unemployment and hence the probability of participation. The only surprise is
that higher bene¯ts appear to reduce the conditional utility of unemployment.
This may indicate that bene¯ts facilitate non-participation, and so discourage
job search.
As before we can calculate the welfare cost of taxation using these estimates.
The calculations are reported in Table 6. This table was calculated in the
same manner as table 3 using equations (17) and (18). The average DWL is
of a similar order of magnitude as in the case of the two models of voluntary
unemployment. The average welfare cost is actually lower in involuntary case.
It is striking, however, the pattern across the wage distribution is so di®erent in
this case. The distribution of the burden of taxes is heavily skewed towards low
earners, with welfare cost falling (as a proportion of tax revenue) as the gross
wage increases. We can get an idea of why this might be the case by looking at
the empirical (unconditional) employment probability shown in Table 6. The
participation rate is basically 100% for those individuals who would receive a
wage in the highest quartile, if they secured employment. Thus the behaviour
of these individuals is relatively insensitive to the tax. In the other two models,
the tax could also distort the choice between employment and unemployment
allowing the tax to have a greater a®ect on behaviour of the above the nedian
wage.
6 Conclusions & Extensions
The goal of this paper was to calculate the dead-weight loss of taxes in a frame
work that explicitly allowed for both unemployment and non-participation. Two
di®erent classes of econometric models were applied to British panel data. Each
model allowed individuals to be employed, unemployed or a non-participant.
The estimates con¯rmed some reasonable hypotheses regarding the labour
market. Most particularly, it seems that employment, unemployment and non-
participation are all qualitatively di®erent states. Any analysis of labour supply
that fails to take this into account could be misleading.
The DWL ¯gures calculated from all the models are much larger than those
typically estimated by labour supply models that adopt the linear approach
to the budget constraint. For example, using the estimates of the traditional
labour supply model reported in Table 1, I calculated the DWL of the 23% tax
rate to be equal to 1:7% of revenue. The di®erence in size between this estimate
34The conditional probability of employment is highest when the respondant is 38 years of
age.
20and those using the discrete choice models, can be explained, to some extent, by
the fact that the traditional estimators do not account for participation e®ects,
whereas the multinomial models used in this paper do. Typically when com-
pensated hours elasticities are estimated, on the assumption of a linear budget
constraint, they turn out to be low (often less than 0:2).35 Thus, conditional
on participation workers are relatively insensitive to tax changes. The discrete
choice models, e®ectively estimate participation elasticities, which are generally
regarded as being larger than the standard hours elasticity.
The labour supply model and the models of section three are measuring
di®erent but related responses. The labour supply model measures the response
to wages of hours worked conditional on participation and employment. This
elasticity is small. Once they have made the decision to participate in the labour
force and once they have a job, men are relatively insensitive to the wage. The
discrete models, however, estimate participation elasticities. These elasticities
are much higher. This is not surprising. If there are ¯xed costs of participation
and job search then individuals' participation decisions will be very sensitive
to the wage level, but once those ¯xed costs have been incurred, individuals
behavior (hours supplied) is relatively insensitive to the wage level.
The calculated DWL of the same taxes will di®er greatly depending on
whether we focus on discrete choice or the hours model. The DWL of taxes
based only on the hours model will be quite low, since workers are relatively in-
sensitive to wage, the government can tax hours with relative impunity. On the
other hand if we use the discrete models, we will get large dead weight losses,
because the participation decision is very sensitive to the wage level.
Although not the original purpose of this paper, its results may help shed
some light on the controversy regarding the alleged bias of the NLBS model
method of Hausman (1985a). While, the DWL ¯gures calculated here turned
out to be much higher than those estimated by the traditional labour supply
literature, they are close to those estimated using the NLBS method. This
suggests that the higher elasticity estimated by the NLBS model could be due
to fact that NLBS accounts for participation (if not unemployment) as here,
whereas the linearized method typically does not.
This paper is a step towards the ultimate goal of a complete characterization
of the impact of taxation on the labour market. Much remains to be done. In
particular two important statistical extensions to this paper and one important
theoretical extension suggest themselves.
Firstly, we must develop an estimation strategy that can incorporate varia-
tion in hours, without dropping the distinction between the three labour market
states. Not accounting for the variation in hours means that we are throwing
way information which could be used to identify individuals' preferences more
accurately.
Another important extension to the statistical model is to allow for dy-
namics. It is quite likely that employment status is more persistent than the
independent variables would suggest. This would occur, for example, if there
35See Pencaval (1986) or Blundell (1993) for surveys of the literature.
21are large costs to both the employer and employee of breaking the match. This
would tend to generate autocorrelated errors. In non-linear models autocorrela-
tion leads to inconsistency as well as ine±ciency. If the persistence is due to the
presence of some unobserved factor speci¯c to each individual, then the random
e®ects estimators could control for it. More, generally, however, we would want
to model the autoregressive nature of the errors directly i.e. the equivalent of
including lags of the dependent variable as regressors in the estimated models.
The most important extension is to improve upon the partial equilibrium
nature of the analysis in this paper. Speci¯cally we must explicitly model the
interaction between the ine±ciency generated by taxation and the ine±ciency
responsible for unemployment in the ¯rst place. This is important because the
interaction could have very substantial implications for welfare. The imposition
of even a small tax on an already distorted economy could have ¯rst order
welfare e®ects. Alternatively, the two sources of ine±ciency could counteract
each other, leading to a lower welfare costs of taxation than that reported here.
Clearly the usual competitive general equilibrium models of tax incidence are
unable to resolve this issue. Its resolution requires research into the theory of
taxation in the labour market.
Lastly, the main result of this paper deserves restating. Even if the reader is
sceptical regarding the appropriateness of the particular econometric speci¯ca-
tion used here, he must accept the basic result of this paper: how one chooses
to model unemployment will signi¯cantly a®ect the estimates of the welfare cost
of taxation of labour income.
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23Table 1: Hours Model
OLS 2SLS
Net Wage (per hour) -0.64 0.22
(0.05) (0.13)












DWL/R (%) 1.4 4.5
1. Standard Errors are in parentheses
2. Dep. Var. is usual hours worked per week
24Table 2: Voluntary Unemployment
MNL NMNL
Ve Vu Ve Vu
Net wage/1000 5.72 - 5.04 -
(0.20) - (0.20) -
Bene¯ts/1000 - 4.09 - 4.05
- (1.14) - (1.12)
Other income/1000 -4.96 {1.67 -3.72 -0.42
(0.14) (0.16) (0.01) (0.13)
Kids -0.09 -0.03 -0.05 -0.02
(0.09) (0.10) (0.06) (0.08)
married 0.64 0.08 0.31 -0.35
(0.16) (0.16) (0.12) (0.14)
Constant 2.79 -2.43 4.12 -0.28
(1.53) (1.61) (1.12) (1.19)
Age -0.17 0.24 -0.35 -0.01
(0.13) (0.13) (0.09) (0.09)
Age2/1000 4.23 -3.75 7.93 1.46
(3.08) (3.26) (3.27) (2.57)
Age3/105 -4.27 0.48 -6.17 -2.08
(2.33) (2.53) (1.68) (1.85)
Inclusive Value (¹) 1 1.94
- (0.14)
Random E®ect 1.42 1.15
(0.12) (0.08)
1. Standard Errors are in parentheses
25Table 3: DWL from MNL Model
Total Quartiles
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Tax Rate 0.24 0.16 0.24 0.26 0.29
(0.05) (0.04) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Gross Wage ($) 1054 464 902 1217 1633
(452) (141) (105) (89) (211)
DWL/R (%) 26.65 20.55 27.26 29.12 19.68
(38.22) (13.93) (29.92) (39.68) (54.55)
DWL ($) 35.89 6.55 35.96 50.52 50.55
(32.85) (7.03) (16.90) (25.64) (45.11)
CV ($) 244.28 41.01 171.11 298.82 466.17
(169.75) (37.59) (63.14) (58.58) (86.87)
Revenue ($) 208.38 34.46 135.15 248.30 415.62
(158.01) (31.84) (59.10) (65.79) (104.32)
Emp. rate 0.75 0.43 0.72 0.88 0.96
after tax (0.30) (0.32) (0.26) (0.17) (0.09)
Unemp. rate 0.13 0.22 0.17 0.08 0.03
after tax (0.12) (0.11) (0.12) (0.08) (0.04)
Emp. rate 0.83 0.50 0.85 0.96 0.99
before tax (0.29) (0.34) (0.23) (0.12) (0.05)
Unemp. rate 0.07 0.17 0.08 0.02 0.00
before tax (0.10) (0.10) (0.08) (0.04) (0.01)
Emp. Rate 0.67 0.40 0.62 0.77 0.87
after tax (0.28) (0.29) (0.24) (0.18) (0.14)
and CV
Unemp rate 0.18 0.23 0.24 0.17 0.09
after tax (0.12) (0.12) (0.12) (0.09) (0.07)
and CV
1. Standard Deviations are in parentheses
2. Quartiles are on the basis of the Gross WageTable 4: DWL from NMNL Model
Total Quartiles
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Tax Rate 0.24 0.16 0.24 0.26 0.29
(0.05) (0.04) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Gross Wage ($) 1054 464 902 1217 1633
(452) (141) (105) (89) (211)
DWL/R (%) 26.86 21.47 37.10 29.03 19.86
(40.68) (16.47) (34.78) (46.01) (53.23)
DWL ($) 35.46 6.56 34.65 48.71 51.93
(32.82) (7.39) (17.31) (26.29) (44.50)
CV ($) 244.57 41.42 172.53 298.83 465.51
(169.16) (38.63) (62.88) (57.61) (86.49)
Revenue ($) 209.11 34.86 137.88 250.11 413.57
(156.84) (32.91) (60.14) (65.39) (102.44)
Emp. rate 0.75 0.44 0.73 0.89 0.96
after tax (0.30) (0.33) (0.26) (0.16) (0.09)
Unemp. rate 0.13 0.21 0.17 0.09 0.04
after tax (0.12) (0.13) (0.13) (0.08) (0.05)
Emp. rate 0.83 0.50 0.85 0.96 0.99
before tax (0.29) (0.35) (0.22) (0.11) (0.05)
Unemp. rate 0.07 0.17 0.09 0.03 0.01
before tax (0.10) (0.11) (0.10) (0.05) (0.02)
Emp. Rate 0.67 0.41 0.64 0.78 0.87
after tax (0.28) (0.31) (0.25) (0.18) (0.13)
and CV
Unemp rate 0.19 0.22 0.24 0.18 0.11
after tax (0.12) (0.13) (0.13) (0.10) (0.08)
and CV
1. Standard Deviations are in parentheses
2. Quartiles are on the basis of the Gross WageTable 5: Involuntary Unemployment
Employment
Ve Vu Probability
Net wage/1000 1.99 - -
(0.43) - -
Bene¯ts/1000 - -7.11 -
- (5.22) -
Other income/1000 -2.01 -0.47 -
(0.11) (0.27) -
Kids -0.12 0.68 -
(0.11) (0.77) -
married 0.64 -0.98 0.36
(0.19) (0.36) (0.03)
constant -0.65 -1.42 -1.32
(0.87) (1.95) (0.16)
Age 0.12 0.11 0.14
(0.05) (0.12) (0.01)
Age2/1000 -1.67 -1.92 -1.79
(0.58) (1.46) (0.07)
U. rate/100 - - -5.17
- - (0.59)
White - - 0.24
- - (0.08)
educ1 - - 0.42
- - (0.07)
educ2 - - 0.40
- - (0.04)
educ3 - - 0.46
- - (0.04)
educ4 - - 0.63
- - (0.06)
educ5 - - 0.72
- - (0.07)




1. Standard Errors are in parenthesesTable 6: DWL from Nested Probit Model
Total Quartiles
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Tax Rate 0.24 0.16 0.24 0.26 0.29
(0.05) (0.04) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Gross Wage ($) 1054 464 902 1217 1633
(452) (141) (105) (89) (211)
DWL/R (%) 22.82 39.44 29.68 14.75 7.42
(24.72) (16.07) (28.70) (22.71) (14.87)
DWL ($) 26.70 12.08 34.74 32.74 27.26
(19.19) (9.48) (14.69) (18.50) (22.59)
CV ($) 257.46 51.22 193.16 313.43 472.02
(165.49) (42.82) (55.95) (45.92) (81.52)
Revenue ($) 230.75 39.15 158.42 280.69 444.76
(161.94) (34.75) (55.13) (53.16) (87.14)
Emp. rate 0.76 0.46 0.75 0.89 0.95
after tax (0.27) (0.31) (0.20) (0.11) (0.05)
Unemp. rate 0.12 0.19 0.16 0.09 0.05
after tax (0.09) (0.11) (0.07) (0.04) (0.02)
Emp. rate 0.77 0.47 0.77 0.89 0.95
before tax (0.26) (0.31) (0.18) (0.09) (0.04)
Unemp. rate 0.13 0.20 0.17 0.09 0.05
before tax (0.09) (0.11) (0.07) (0.04) (0.02)
Emp. Rate 0.75 0.45 0.73 0.87 0.94
after tax (0.27) (0.31) (0.21) (0.12) (0.07)
and CV
Unemp rate 0.12 0.19 0.15 0.09 0.05
after tax (0.09) (0.11) (0.07) (0.04) (0.02)
and CV
1. Standard Deviations are in parentheses
2. Quartiles are on the basis of the Gross WageTable 7: Summary of DWL Measures
Total Quartiles
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Tax Rate 0.24 0.16 0.24 0.26 0.29
(0.05) (0.04) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
MNL 0.27 0.21 0.37 0.29 0.20
(0.38) (0.14) (0.30) (0.40) (0.55)
NMNL 0.27 0.21 0.37 0.29 0.20
(0.41) (0.16) (0.35) (0.46) (0.53)
Nested Probit 0.23 0.39 0.30 0.15 0.07
(0.25) (0.16) (0.29) (0.23) (0.15)
1. Standard Deviations are in parentheses
2. Quartiles are on the basis of the Gross Wage
30Table 8: BHPS Data
Variable De¯nition Mean Stn. Dev.
age age at date of interview 40.98 14.43
health =1 if su±ciently healthy for work 0.85 0.35
marstat marital status - -
kids number of own children in house 0.55 0.95
region region / metrapolitan area -
pasoc father's occupation - -
tae age left school/college 17.77 4.21
educ higher value{higher ed -
white =1 if white 0.97 0.18
other income reported monthly non-labour income 228.91 371.14
k02y no. of children aged 0-2 0.08 0.28
k34y no. of children aged 3-4 0.08 0.28
k511y no. of children aged 5-11 0.25 0.6
k1215y no. of children aged 12-15 0.17 0.45
k1618y no. of children aged 16-18 0.04 0.21
nwage observed monthly net wage
gwage observed monthly gross wage
ben observed monthly bene¯ts
net wage predicted monthly net wage 781.39 300.08
gross wage predicted monthly gross wage 1054.04 451.66
bene¯ts predicted monthly bene¯ts 225.41 77.55
U. rate regional male unemployment rate 12.48 2.41
married =1 if married 0.64 0.48
hoh =1 if head of household 0.75 0.43
1. Statistics are calculated for the pooled cross section
31Table 6: Predicted Values
selection Net Gross Bene¯ts Selection
for wage Wage Wage for Bene¯ts
Dep. Var nwage>0 ln(nwage) ln(gwage) ln(ben) ben>0
Indep. Vars. Coef. t-stat. Coef. t-stat Coef. t-stat Coef. t-stat Coef. t-stat
cons -3.62 -9.98 4.07 22.23 3.90 18.83 3.91 8.95 -1.05 -3.00
age 0.22 8.58 0.17 14.71 0.20 15.17 0.08 2.85 0.02 1.09
age2 /103 -3.29 -5.46 -3.26 -11.63 -3.81 -12.01 -1.13 -1.99 -0.57 -1.29
age3/104 0.05 1.04 0.21 8.71 0.25 9.04 0.00 0.25 0.04 1.44
k02y -0.38 -6.69 0.10 4.74 0.12 4.86 0.26 3.86 0.38 6.31
k34y -0.30 -5.13 0.06 2.72 0.07 2.85 0.26 3.68 0.34 5.58
k511y -0.20 -7.14 0.02 2.00 0.02 1.89 0.11 3.12 0.17 5.66
k1215y -0.09 -2.40 -0.01 -0.75 -0.02 -1.13 0.17 3.49 0.17 4.14
k1618y -0.15 -2.10 -0.19 -6.70 -0.20 -6.41 -0.01 -0.12 0.06 0.65
pasoc1 -0.10 -0.81 0.17 3.44 0.21 3.75 -0.24 -1.26 -0.30 -1.99
pasoc2 0.15 1.35 0.15 3.37 0.18 3.66 -0.13 -0.81 -0.26 -2.02
pasoc3 0.08 0.68 0.07 1.42 0.08 1.62 -0.07 -0.43 -0.05 -0.33
pasoc4 0.07 0.69 0.07 1.72 0.09 1.93 -0.11 -0.68 -0.01 -0.10
pasoc5 0.01 0.13 0.09 2.09 0.12 2.29 0.02 0.10 0.13 0.96
pasoc6 0.03 0.22 0.04 0.71 0.05 0.89 -0.06 -0.36 0.15 1.04
marstat2 -0.85 -7.91 0.15 3.08 0.20 3.51 -0.05 -0.43 0.97 9.29
marstat3 -0.68 -10.29 0.03 1.02 0.07 2.06 0.01 0.13 0.85 12.69
marstat4 -0.24 -1.86 -0.35 -5.07 -0.34 -4.38 0.16 1.44 0.45 4.90
marstat5 -0.55 -10.46 -0.01 -0.23 0.03 1.11 -0.19 -2.58 0.43 7.44
white 0.31 4.06 -0.02 -0.69 -0.02 -0.55 -0.20 -2.08 -0.31 -3.64
health 1.14 27.34 -0.23 -5.09 -0.27 -5.33 -0.09 -1.68 -0.30 -6.68
hoh -0.05 -0.98 0.13 6.97 0.16 7.68 0.06 1.01 -0.14 -2.57
educ1 - - 0.16 6.18 0.19 6.40 - - - -
educ2 - - 0.17 10.56 0.21 11.19 - - - -
educ3 - - 0.23 13.54 0.27 14.02 - - - -
educ4 - - 0.34 14.60 0.40 15.12 - - - -
educ5 - - 0.42 19.86 0.49 20.30 - - - -
educ6 - - 0.49 14.01 0.55 14.04 - - - -
region2 - - - - - - - - -0.22 -1.31
region3 0.35 3.14 - - - - - - -0.31 -2.46
region4 0.15 1.10 - - - - - - -0.26 -1.78
region5 0.22 1.21 - - - - - - -0.13 -0.65
region6 0.39 2.72 - - - - - - -0.46 -2.83
region7 0.13 0.74 - - - - - - -0.13 -0.67
region8 0.26 1.56 - - - - - - -0.34 -1.72
region9 0.36 1.97 - - - - - - -0.18 -0.94
region10 -0.47 -2.11 - - - - - - 0.30 1.33
region11 -0.12 -0.72 - - - - - - 0.02 0.13
region12 0.01 0.04 - - - - - - 0.05 0.24
region13 0.38 1.98 - - - - - - -0.40 -1.85
region14 0.33 1.54 - - - - - - -0.27 -1.14
region15 0.16 0.74 - - - - - - -0.44 -1.79
region16 0.10 0.56 - - - - - - -0.26 -1.33
region17 0.14 0.87 - - - - - - -0.37 -2.03
region18 0.16 1.20 - - - - - - -0.45 -2.94
region2*time -0.89 -0.19 - - - - - - -2.49 -0.43
region3*time 0.12 0.04 - - - - - - -4.48 -1.19
region4*time 7.58 1.73 - - - - - - -1.10 -0.23
region5*time -7.26 -1.12 - - - - - - 2.19 0.32
region6*time -7.71 -1.69 - - - - - - 4.30 0.81
region7*time -0.57 -0.09 - - - - - - -1.02 -0.15
region8*time -0.28 -0.05 - - - - - - -3.95 -0.55
region9*time -5.52 -0.84 - - - - - - -0.55 -0.08
region10*time 18.64 2.12 - - - - - - -19.57 -2.05
region11*time 8.12 1.35 - - - - - - -11.28 -1.63
region12*time -4.70 -0.64 - - - - - - -4.29 -0.54
region13*time -13.75 -2.02 - - - - - - 6.75 0.86
region14*time 0.31 0.04 - - - - - - 0.14 0.02
region15*time -6.73 -0.83 - - - - - - 10.96 1.25
region16*time 1.63 0.26 - - - - - - 0.05 0.01
region17*time -3.74 -0.71 - - - - - - 4.19 0.69
region18*time -1.88 -0.44 - - - - - - 5.64 1.14
Mills ratio -0.67 -9.76 -0.78 -10.11 0.3 6.02 - -
R2/pseudo R2 0.42 0.42 0.43 0.81 0.65